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Any proposed restructuringof the corporate tax system is more
likely to be attracted to the well-publicized large conglomerate
takeovers, ignoring some of the impact of these changes on the least
vocal "silent majority" of small or closely held corporations.
Mr. Shaw's presentationreminds us of the need to focus attention
on the difficulties the proposed rules may cause when selling stock
in small corporations;the repeal of General Utilities may be more
burdensome to the closely held corporationwhere the assets distributed in a complete liquidation may be ordinaryand not capitalgain
assets, thus increasing the cost of liquidation to an amount higher
than 50%, and the searchfor non-corporate entities (including the
"S"corporation)for conducting business. Some of these alternative
entities may preclude growth commonly associated with the regular
corporation. Despite these concerns, however, Mr. Shaw sees the
proposed changes as aiding the small corporation, in avoiding complexity, and generally having a better chance of coping with the tax
structure (both for planning and tax impact purposes).
In assessing the potential impact of these proposals, some typical
problems in the day-to-day life span of a closely held corporation,
are described by Mr. Lang. He first provides a useful chronology of
key events that occur in the various phases of a corporate business
(which he describes as being generally a one generation existence in
Californiapractice).
After describing the various SFC Proposals,Mr. Lang concludes
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that even with a total repeal of General Utilities (taxing the corporation on allproperty distributionswhere value exceeds basis), most
taxpayers would still continue to utilize the corporateform. However, closely held corporationswould be less likely to distribute appreciated property to their shareholders;and in the context of a
complete liquidation, according to Mr. Lang, the "S" Corporation
election would have greater importance, thereby generating a review
as to whether the "S" corporationeligibility requirements should be
expanded.

IMPACT OF PROPOSALS ON ACQUISITIONS
OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS

RICHARD A. SHAW*

Our purpose in this presentation is to evaluate the impact of the
proposed tax reform provisions on closely held corporations. One of
the major foundations of the entire corporate reform package concerns the fluid character of inter-corporate transactions. If we look
back to the initial purposes and premises of the proposals, we find
they are predicated on several assumptions: first, that it is considered
important that the corporation and its shareholders be able to
restructure their corporate investment on a continuing tax-free basis,
second, that the investors should not be locked into their form of
investment, third, that the sale by the shareholders of the corporate
stock should be permitted without requiring the corporation to recognize gain, and finally, that gain in certain types of corporate combinations should not be recognized by those shareholders who receive
only stock in the acquisition. They are also premised on the principle
that the tax laws should remain neutral among various combinations,
purchases, and divestitures of business enterprises.
I intend to examine the impact of the proposals as they relate to
acquisitions concerning the small or closely held business. I think it
is essential that we first examine the perspective from which we
choose to view the small business corporation. It is frequently family
owned. It has a nucleus of a few individuals who have different skills
which they consolidate to develop the business together. I often think
that such a nucleus might be composed, for example, of the engineer
or the idea person who created the product, the administrator, the
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salesmen, and of course, finally, the investors. The key ingredient is a
small intertwined group of shareholders where majority control is retained in the hands of a few and influence is easily shifted. There
might be 35 or fewer investors as with the S corporation; or a situation where five or less are in control as with a personal holding company. We are not reflecting on the giants of the industry - the major deal-makers who structure gigantic takeovers with many multifaceted schemes. We are not talking about the type of transactions
in which the Wall Street Journal is likely to get interested and which
would become the focal point for a major legislative revision. In general, the closely held corporation frequently represents the small
group of persons that are brought along with major tax reform and
become the subject of whatever happens to the conglomerates.
There are many reasons for the acquisition of a small business
corporation. From the buyer's viewpoint, the reason may be a key
product or a market that is sought. The reason may be some invention. It may be key personnel. From the seller's viewpoint, it may
simply be an economical opportunity. The seller may need additional
capital infusion that the combination will offer. It may be that success had been such that the business is ripe for a takeover at a premium price. Frequently, it is simply a matter of change in family
circumstances. It may be retirement (or perhaps the death) of the
head of the enterprise in a situation where the children do not want
to continue in the business. These considerations comprise the perspective from which I want to move forward.
Historically, it is clear when we deal with reorganizations or acquisitions, that we are talking about the gamesmanship of reorganization tax management. It is a game for the rich - those who can
afford the sophistication of well qualified counsel. As I listened to
Marty Ginsburg's comments earlier in this symposium, it became
very evident that the well-to-do can do very well. It does not make
any difference what the structure is. If the goal becomes "impossible," it only becomes a question of taking a little bit longer to accomplish. With the closely held business, accomplishing some of the
goals may not be possible.
The guidelines that we have in the present system for establishing
recognition or non-recognition in an acquisition are now based upon
an extremely complex and very intricate set of standards. We have
come a long way since 1918, when the sole question was whether a
merger or consolidation existed under state law. Now the statutory
merger must also be tested under numerous judicially enunciated
doctrines such as the continuity of interest, continuity of business
enterprise, the business purpose, and the step transaction doctrines.
Numerous statutory formulae for stock and asset acquisitions have
been added to the Code which must be carefully scrutinized for con-
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tent to assure the accepted form is satisfied, as form prevails over
substance. Since the conditions for each type of reorganization are
different, arbitrary, and ambiguous, the practitioner must probe each
solution to ascertain which form will control if the acquisition falls
into more than one form. Finally, of course, we have the problem of
each shareholder. The success of each shareholder in seeking nonrecognition is dependent upon the consideration received by all of the
other shareholders. There must be continuity of interest in the
aggregate.
Although the reorganization provisions are not elective, history
has demonstrated that experienced practitioners can frequently control a transaction in order to obtain a qualified carryover basis reorganization, or to gain a stepped-up basis in a non-qualified sale or
exchange, whichever is its goal.
Considering all of these factors and problems, let us examine the
reform proposals to see how the revised system would affect small
business. From the viewpoint of the closely held corporation, the proposed rules for classifying qualified acquisitions, as a whole, appear
to be a major step forward. They satisfy many of the goals for reform. They satisfy these goals in that: (1) they are simple, (2) they
reduce the need to manipulate the structure to satisfy form, (3) they
provide uniformity of application (and thereby neutrality), and (4)
they enhance compliance by providing certainty.
The revised acquisition structure revolves around six integrated
principles.' First, qualification of the corporation for non-recognition
should be determined independently from the treatment accorded
shareholders. Second, the test for qualification should not be dependent upon the consideration received by the acquired target corporation. Third, a qualifying corporation should be entitled to elect
whether to have a carryover basis in the acquired corporation.
Fourth, if the election is to pick up basis to cost, then the target
corporation must recognize gain on any assets not transferred to the
shareholders. Shareholders would be permitted to receive stock taxfree, regardless of the election to recognize or not recognize gain at
the corporate level, or the nature of the consideration received by the
other shareholders. Finally, the collapsible corporation rules of section 341 would be repealed for domestic corporations. Repeal is premised upon the condition that unrealized income ultimately would be
1. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION
OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1983) [hereinafter cited as SFC REPORT].

taxed at the corporate level.
Moving from the general to the specific, it would be helpful to
consider the impact of specific provisions on closely held
corporations.
In general, the new definitions for acquisitions qualifying for tax
deferral have been applauded for their simplicity and clarity. Looking to the qualified stock acquisition, the proposals anticipate that an
acquisition of stock would be a qualified stock acquisition if at least
80% of the voting power and at least 80% of the value of other stock
is acquired within a twelve-month period. From the viewpoint of the
closely held corporation, I see the potential for two problem areas.
Each would make it more difficult to qualify for tax deferral. The
first one deals with issue of creeping control. In a present reorganization, any stock for stock exchange will qualify as long as there is
control immediately after the acquisition. For instance, examine the
situation where corporation X owns 70%, or even 80%, of the stock
of corporation Y prior to the acquisition. If X acquires another 10%
in exchange for its own stock, then there is a reorganization under
present law, since there is at least 80% control immediately after the
exchange. The proposed revision would lead to a significantly different result. Proposed sections 391(a) and 393(a) of the Senate Finance Committee Draft Bill 2 would require that stock representing
control be acquired in a transaction or series of transactions during
the twelve-month acquisition period commencing on the date of the
first purchase of stock. As a consequence, it appears that qualified
stock acquisition treatment would be precluded for any corporation
which has held any stock for more than one year.
A second concern deals with the issue of related parties. Under the
new law, it is contemplated that any stock acquired from a related
person, using the standards of section 318, would not be counted in
determining whether the acquisition is of 80% control. Stock acquired from related persons would be counted only when at least
50% of the acquired stock is obtained from strangers.
Neither of these conditions apply under present law. In the world
of closely held corporations, we can anticipate that both of the conditions would have a negative impact on the size of the marketplace,
which would make it more difficult for small business shareholders to
be able to sell their stock.
Next, let's consider the qualified-asset acquisition. As discussed
earlier in the symposium, an acquisition of assets would be a qualified-asset acquisition if it is a merger, a consolidation or a transaction in which one corporation acquires substantially all of the assets
of another corporation. The proposed law would remove any uncer2.

SFC Draft Bill was reported at Document 84-186 in Tax Notes, Jan. 9, 1984.
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tainty as to the definition of the phrase "substantially all" by establishing an arbitrary percentage to be applied in the future. New section 391 would require the acquisition of at least 90% of the gross
fair market value and 70% of the net fair market value of all assets.
Many of you will recall that this is essentially the test under Revenue Procedure 77-37,3 which the government has used for years in
issuing revenue rulings. The proposal would thus establish a precise
standard. The new standard would disregard the individuality, which
was permitted under Revenue Ruling 57-518.4 The old ruling permitted the taxpayer to look to the nature of the property retained,
the purpose of the retention, and the amount of the retention. For
example, under present law, in the James Armour Inc.5 case, only
51% of the assets were transferred, but the assets which were transferred constituted 100% of the operating assets of the corporation.
The court concluded that substantially all of the assets had been
transferred and that the transaction qualified as a reorganization.
We can anticipate that the proposed arbitrary 90% standard will be
of substantial concern to the closely held corporation. In the environment of the small business, corporations are much more likely to
have less flexibility in meeting the objective statutory standards.
One of the principal virtues of the new proposals for small business is the repeal of many of the traditional judicial doctrines established by the courts to test reorganization qualification. This change
is potentially significant because most of the traditional doctrines
are considered confusing, unrealistic, and are frequently unevenly
applied.
Each of the major doctrines has significant defects. For example,
uncertainty has existed as to the degree of continuity of interest
which is required, and the test fails to assure any meaningful continuity of management when the acquiring corporation is a large
conglomerate. Likewise, the continuity of business enterprise test has
been the subject of extensive litigation and posturing by the Internal
Revenue Service.' It is questionable whether the new Treasury Regulation section 1.368-1(b) will survive in future litigation. Even the
step transaction doctrine has been subjected to various interpretations. At times the doctrine has been expressed as requiring a bind3. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
4.

Rev. Rul. 57-518, 1957-2 CB. 253.

5. James Armour, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
6. E.g., Becker v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955) and Rev. Rul. 6329, 1963-1 C.B. 77 (an earlier withdrawing of the continuity of business enterprise
doctrine).

ing commitment or mutual interdependence of steps; at other times
it is viewed as merely seeking a particular end result.7 The removal
of these judicial doctrines would be major accomplishments for small
businesses. Henceforth, taxpayers would be entitled to look directly
to the statute for guidelines in formulating the character of their
transactions.
Removal of these standards would have a profound impact on the
role of each individual shareholder in the reorganization process,
since each shareholder would be able to establish the character of his
transaction, without dependence upon the goals or negotiations of
others. For example, assume that purchaser P wants to acquire 100%
of the stock of target T, from its four equal shareholders. Even if the
other three shareholders all want cash in the transaction, the fourth
shareholder, by taking stock, may have a qualified stock acquisition
so that gain would not be recognized to him. However, the transaction would have failed the present continuity of interest doctrine, because only 25% of the shareholders would have continuity of interest
in P.
Another major benefit of the proposals would be the elimination of
the limitation restricting the character of consideration which may
be received by the acquiring corporation. This would provide significantly more flexibility in planning for a qualified acquisition of a
corporation. No longer must the "B" reorganization be solely for
voting stock, 8 nor would boot in excess of 20% destroy the "C" reorganization, 9 nor would we have arbitrary conditions which require
only voting stock for a reverse triangular merger, 10 but permit any
stock for a forward triangular merger." On the whole, the new classifications definitions would establish greater simplicity and certainty
which would be very attractive to the small businessman.
One of the most beneficial characteristics of the reform proposals
is the ability of the parties to elect either a carryover basis or a cost
basis for assets acquired in the acquisition. This selectivity is a natural extension of the election first permitted in section 338 for qualified stock purchases and it is a major step forward from the limited
benefits of the Kimball-Diamond2 case and old section 334(b)2.
Many have considered that sophisticated tax practitioners always
have a choice. Perhaps such is the case. More importantly, the "corner drugstore" would now be able to participate in the election with7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
F.2d 718

SFC REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1982).
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(B) (1982).
I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E) (1982).
I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D) (1982).
Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), affd, 187
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
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out a lot of complex planning.
There are several election issues which the small business is going
to have to examine and which merit comment. For example, the proposals have opted to permit the election to be made on a corporation
by corporation basis, when the acquired corporation has subsidiaries.
Earlier speakers have debated the merits of this conclusion. It is sufficient here to recognize that it affords an imp.ortant planning consideration which will require an examination of the entire superstructure of parent/subsidiary corporations to position assets for the best
utilization in an acquisition. It may be of the greatest benefit in a
multi-tiered system to position some assets to utilize a carryover basis while positioning others in an advantageous position to permit the
use of a cost basis acquisition. The rule would also appear to encourage the greater use of subsidiaries when long term acquisitions
can be foreseen.
A second issue concerns the application of the antiselectivity rules
of section 338 to assure consistency for all acquisitions. If an asset
has been purchased by an acquiring corporation during the two-year
consistency period, then the election governing the target applies to
that asset. For example, if T sells equipment to P for six months
before the merger of T into S, a subsidiary of P, then the carryover
basis election of S in the merger will also apply to the equipment
purchased by P. This solution is probably an improvement over section 338, which arbitrarily establishes a deemed cost basis election,
even if only a single asset is purchased from the acquired corporation
d'uring the consistency period. Although objections have frequently
been raised that the Rule unreasonably restricts the activities of the
target corporation with its all or nothing approach to the disposition
of assets, my primary concern is with the complexity which rules like
this create for the small corporation.
The election process may also affect the shareholders of the small
business. In a qualified-asset acquisition, there must be a joint election by both the acquired corporation and the acquiring shareholders. However, in a qualified stock acquisition, or a merger, the election to use a cost basis is made only be the acquiring corporation
(surviving corporation in the case of a merger). In this instance, the
election is not made by the acquired corporation, because T is under
the control of the acquiring corporation after the stock purchase.
When the control of the target is less than 100%, its minority shareholders will have no say and will be forced to accept the consequences of the corporate tax on the appreciated undistributed assets.

Unfortunately, in a qualified stock acquisition of 81% of the stock,
the minority 19% shareholders may be subjected to a corporate level
tax in a transaction over which they have no control.
One final complexity for small businesses which arises under this
subject would be the different priorities enunciated in the election
process. A carryover basis election would be presumed for stock acquisitions and mergers, while a cost basis election is presumed for
asset acquisitions. While each presumption seems proper and reasonably consistent with the type of transaction, the different presumption, absent an election, exemplifies the constant need for attention
to details, which is required in the reorganization area, and which is
occasionally overlooked in the management of small businesses.
An examination of the corporate tax treatment of acquisitions using a carryover basis for assets evidences that the treatment would
be substantially the same as that existing for reorganizations under
the present code. The rules for non-reorganization of tax to the target corporation, basis and carryover of tax attributes are all familiar
to experienced businessmen. However, there is a primary change
which would have a significant impact. In order for an asset acquisition to qualify for carryover basis treatment, the target corporation
would be required to liquidate and distribute all of its assets (including the stock and other consideration received in the acquisition)
within twelve months of the acquisitions. 13 No longer may the target
corporation continue in existence with any retained assets. The price
of failure to liquidate in a qualified asset acquisition would be heavy.
The acquisition would still technically be a qualified asset acquisition. However, proposed section 394 would tax the target on the net
gain recognized to the extent of boot. The staff report also indicates
that the target would be required to recognize the gain on any unrealized appreciation of assets not transferred, but I have not found
any support for this in the proposed bill. The net gain would be
taxed as long term capital gain. If one desires to seek conformity for
the practical "C" merger with the statutory "A" merger, the required liquidation is consistent with the original congressional purpose. The purpose of initially qualifying a transfer of substantially
all assets for stock as a reorganization was to permit qualification of
a transaction which did not satisfy the technical requirements of a
state law merger. The change would provide grater conformity between the practical merger and the statutory merger. The Rule
would have no special impact on closely held corporations which differs significantly from any other corporations.
13. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 subsequently amended section 368(a)(2)(G) to
require the target in a C reorganization to distribute the stock securities and other property received, as well as its other properties, in order to qualify as a reorganization. See
The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 63(a), 98. Stat. 494, 583 (1984).
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A major change would occur under the reform proposals permitting an election to a step-up basis in the assets of the target corporation. This would be most advantageous, but there is a price for the
step-up in basis. The price is an agreement on the part of the target
corporation to recognize gain on all of its assets as if they were sold
at fair market value on the date of the acquisition. Historically, only
under old section 334(b)(2) or in a qualified stock purchase under
section 338 could a stepped-up basis be obtained. However, under
present law, the transaction has not subjected the corporation to a
corporate tax on the transfer of appreciated property because of the
application of section 337.
When viewed solely at the corporate level, the consequences of the
change are appropriate. If the acquiring corporation wants a stepped
basis in the assets, then the transaction should be treated as a taxable sale on the part of the target. The real problem arises when the
acquired corporation is liquidated in connection with the acquisition.
The corporation's 28% capital gain rate when coupled with the
shareholder's capital gain would generate a total 42.4% tax. This
may impose an unrealistic tax burden on the shareholders.
I suggest putting this in the perspective of the closely held small
business. We are normally dealing with a family company which is
operated for an extended period, perhaps for several generations.
There may be a wide range of assets and significant real estate.
Many of the assets will have been subjected to substantial appreciation, largely as a result of the inflationary economy. Let me present
an illustration.
Assume that in 1970, A establishes a sole proprietorship with
$100,000 in assets. In 1980, when the assets are worth $230,000, A
contributes the assets to a new wholly owned corporation. In 1990, A
either liquidates the corporation or transfers the assets in a qualified
asset acquisition when the assets are worth $440,000. In that case, as
a result of the corporate tax on appreciated property and distribution
of the proceeds to A, A will have a tax cost of $144,160, representing 42.4% of the $340,000 gain. It has been represented that this
represents a realistic tax on appreciated property.
Assume one additional factor which I have not mentioned. The
entire $144,160 represents only the impact of inflation. The rate of
inflation from 1970 to 1980 was 130%. Projecting only a 7% rate of
inflation per year from 1980 to 1990, we end up with a total rate of
inflation of 320%. The fair market value of $440,000 in 1990 is the
equivalent to the $100,000 investment in 1970. After paying his tax

of $144,160, the taxpayer has, suffered a loss of 42.4% on his
twenty-year investment.
From the viewpoint of academic tax reform, the tax on capital
gain at the time of sale integrates properly with the corporate structure. The difficulty is that the academic analysis fails to take into
account the impact of the economy upon the investors and the shareholders who make up the business community in the United States.
The question remains whether there should be a distinction between recognizing gain in a disposition where the acquired assets remain in corporate solution, and in the situation where the proceeds
are distributed to the shareholders in liquidation. John S. Nolan, former Chairman of the American Bar Association (ABA) Section on
Taxation, in his testimony before congressional hearings on this matter, touched on this subject.' 4 He observed that it is a fundamental
assumption of our system that, upon a decision to terminate business
and completely liquidate the shareholders' interest, the taxpayers do
so in the expectation that they will incur only a single capital gains
tax on the appreciation and on the value of the underlying assets in
their business. This clear understanding has existed, whether they
expect to sell the business to a third party, or divide the business
among themselves while it is in corporate solution, or whether they
take their respective shares of the asset income and operate in the
future as sole proprietors or partnership. To this extent, I believe
that we have an integrated tax system. The system has been
designed to assure when shareholders terminate their interest, that
they will be subjected to only a single capital gains tax. That single
tax represents a sufficient excise for the right of withdrawing the
assets from the corporation. It is unnecessary to impose the double
penalty tax on the corporation and on the shareholders when there is
a concurrent liquidating distribution.
I am fearful also that the new rule would have a devastating impact upon the operation of a closely held business. If a family
chooses to incorporate, they would substantially limit the market for
future disposition of the business. The family can sell stock to other
individuals at a single 20% capital gain tax rate. However, should
80% of the stock be sold to a corporation, the buyer will discount the
price. If the acquiring corporation takes a carryover basis, the price
will be discounted because, for depreciation purposes, the assets
would have a lower acquired basis. In addition, the acquiring corporation would anticipate the likelihood that it may be necessary in the
future to sell the stock to another corporation in a reorganization
14. Proposed Reform and Simplification of the Income Taxation of Corporations:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (testimony
of John S. Nolan, former Chair. ABA Section on Taxation).
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with a carryover basis, in order to avoid a corporate liquidation gain
inherent in the tax at the corporate level on the appreciated properties which it acquired. In the alternative, any sale to a corporation
electing a cost basis acquisition, would result in the discount of the
price for the stock to take into account the corporate tax required for
the target as a condition for the purchase. It is evident, in either
case, that the selling price of the corporation may be a substantially
reduced price because of the proposed liquidation tax. This must be
compared with the single tax impact for the disposition of a sole
proprietorship or partnership.
The result is that owners of closely held enterprises would need to
seriously re-evaluate the merits of incorporation in our American tax
system. Even should they elect to incorporate, we would find a significant change in the character of assets transferred to the corporation.
It would be necessary to keep out of the corporation any assets
which are likely to significantly appreciate in value. In addition, they
would need to seriously consider the tax cost of transferring property
to a corporation which has already appreciated in value above the
earlier cost basis. For the purpose of this discussion, the subject of
depreciation recapture has been excluded as having its own appropriate consequences.
The problem of taxing appreciated property at the corporate level
is a real one. Ron Pearlman, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, in his testimony before the hearings espoused the view of the
Treasury that double taxation of liquidation gains is not appropriate. 15 The Treasury Department suggests the adoption of shareholder credit in the form recommended by the American Bar Association. Edward N. Delaney, the present Chair of the American Bar
Association Section of Taxation, has suggested that an appropriate
solution may be an exemption for closely held business based upon a
maximum number of shareholders and a maximum asset value." A
third, more broad solution, may be to utilize a concept similar to
section 337 to provide for a single tax in the event that the target
corporation is liquidated in connection with a qualified acquisition
within a specified period of time. A fourth possibility envisions exempting the corporate distribution and providing a general rule simi15.

Reform of the Corporate Taxation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on

Finance, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (statement of Ronald Pearlman, Deputy Ass't.
Sec. for Tax Policy).
16. ProposedReform and Simplification of the Income Taxation of Corporations:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (statement
of Edward Delaney, Chair., ABA Comm. on Taxation).

lar to that available in a section 333 liquidation. Any of these solutions would be more palatable than providing for a corporate gain
tax on liquidation without mitigating the amount of tax in some way.
I also want to briefly touch on a few other changes from the viewpoint of small business. One of the significant revisions creates an
opportunity for each shareholder to attain non-recognition in a corporate acquisition upon the receipt of stock, without being concerned
about the continuity of interest test. This is probably one of the most
important features of the new proposals. This will enable each shareholder to elect to select stock and treat it on a tax-free basis, without
being concerned about obtaining sufficient cash to pay the tax on the
acquired stock and without being concerned about the actions of
other investors.
Without question, the repeal of section 341 would be applauded as
a very positive benefit to all. I am often reminded that the first sentence of section 341 is twice as long as Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. The extremely complex provisions with its intricate definitions,
presumptions, exceptions, exceptions to exceptions, escape hatches
and deferred penalties, has created an abyss which small business
will be delighted to eliminate. While the abuses which section 341 is
designed to prevent are real, more simple direct statutory guidelines
17
are needed. If the difficult problems regarding the General Utilities
doctrine can be resolved through these proposals, small business may
reasonably anticipate avoiding the problems engendered by the collapsible corporation trap.
In the course of developing the corporate tax reform provision proposals, it is evident that the Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service have utilized the opportunity to overcome prevailing
practices which they believe are inconsistent with the Government's
philosophy of minimizing tax avoidance and maximizing revenue collection. Thus it is, that the subject of liquidation-reincorporation has
been dealt with in the proposals. Henceforth, a liquidation accompanied by a reincorporation of part or all of the assets would not result
in a step-up in basis for the acquired assets when there is continuity
in interest of 50% or more. In testing for 50% continuity, the attribu17. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935) (holding
that a corporation did not realize taxable income from the distribution of appreciated
property to its shareholders). As a result of subsequent legislation, section 311(d) now
taxes the corporation on most distributions of appreciated property to shareholders. Section 341 has been used as a foundation to prevent the use of other means of disposing of
the value of the corporation (e.g., stock sales of complete liquidations) to convert unrealized ordinary income generated in the business to capital gains at the shareholder level.
The comments at this symposium evidence the very difficult tax policy problems which
need to be resolved in determining the extent to which distributions of appreciated property to shareholders should be taxed, particularly with respect to distributions in
liquidation.
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tion rules of section 318 would be applied. The revision would reduce

the present use of liquidation reincorporations to bail out earnings
and profits at capital gain rates in the course of a liquidation accompanied with a concurrent step-up in basis for depreciable assets
transferred to a new corporation. In the early James Armour, Inc.
decision,"" the Government succeeded in treating a liquidation as a
"D" reorganization where the corporation was liquidated and only
51% of the assets, constituting all of the operating assets, were transferred to the corporation in the same proportion by the same shareholders. However, the Government has not been successful in treating a liquidation-reincorporation as a reorganization unless there has
been at least 80% continuity of control, as in a D reorganization. For
example, in Joseph C. Gallagher,'9 A step-up in basis was permitted
when 62% of the liquidating corporation's shareholders ended up
owning 73% of the acquiring corporation's stock. The reduction of
the continuity of interest test from 80% to 50% in a non-devisive D
reorganization would eliminate the risk of a bail out of earnings and
profits through a liquidation accompanied by a reincorporation
where there is a continuing majority controlling interest. While the
revision has been endorsed within the American Bar Association,

there remains a flicker of concern about the issue of consistency. The
taxpayer who desires to obtain a tax-free reorganization is required
to obtain 80% continuity of interest. Obversely, when a reorganization would be of benefit to the Government, it would now have a
50% test.2 0 It is this willful breach of the rule of consistency which
makes the tax system both more complex and frequently unfair in
application.
In my concluding comments, I would like to reflect upon the impact which Subchapter S has in evaluating the consequences of the
corporate tax reform provisions. Professor Wolfman has indicated
that Subchapter S may be the ideal vehicle for us to use as an alternative to the present problem of General Utilities.2 ' From the perspective of small business, Subchapter S can be a very effective alternative. Subchapter S, as revised by the Subchapter S Revision
18. James Armour, Inc. v. Commisioner, 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
19. Joseph C. Gallagher v. Commisioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
20. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 subsequently amended section 368(c)(2) to provide for a 50% control test in a "D" reorganization when section 354(1)(A) and (B) are
satisfied. See the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 64(a), 98 Stat. 494,
584 (1984).
21. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). See also
note 17 and accompanying text.

Act of 1982, provides an ideal vehicle for the operation of a small
business. In early years when losses are anticipated, those losses may
be passed through to the shareholders and incorporated into their
individual tax structure. Even when the corporation has substantial
profits, the election provides an effective integrated tax system when
the shareholders have a pattern of distributing current earnings as
received by the corporation. From an academic viewpoint, the election provides a greater tax consistency since all profits are taxed to
the shareholders when earned. However, it is also important to recognize that there are many problems with eligibility and administration. The number of shareholders is limited to thirty-five. There are
strict limitations on the character of shareholders. Only individuals,
estates, and certain trusts may qualify. Neither corporations nor
partnerships may qualify as shareholders. In addition, the corporation may have only one class of stock. These shareholder restrictions
significantly limit the market for potential investors. At the corporate level, the corporation is prohibited from being a member of an
affiliated group under section 1504. As a result, we must temper our
enthusiasm for Subchapter S by being cognizant that it is an alternative which is suitable for only a few businesses.
Assuming that Subchapter S is an otherwise suitable choice for a
closely held business, let's evaluate the consequences of an acquisition under the corporate reform proposals.
Section 1371 of Subchapter S provides that the general rules of
Subchapter C shall apply to an S Corporation and its shareholders
except to the extent that Subchapter C is inconsistent with Subchapter S. Historically it has been well recognized that the reorganization provisions
of Subchapter C are applied to an acquisition of an
22
S Corporation.
There had been some earlier concern that the anti-affiliation rule
would destroy a Subchapter S election for an S Corporation involved
in acquisition. However, Revenue Ruling 72-320 assured that monetary control of a new subsidiary in connection with a devisive D Reorganization coupled with a section 355 split-up would not be destructive.23 The next year in Revenue Ruling 73-496, the service also
applied the same principles to a controlled corporation stock acquisition with an immediate liquidation applying old section 334(b)(2).2 4
In each instance, the service disregarded the interim acquisition of
controlling stock as merely the initial step in an integrated plan to
acquire assets. As such, the Subchapter S status was preserved.
Let's next examine the impact of an application of the Subchapter
22. E.g., Rev. Rul. 71-266, 1971-1 C.B. 262 (concerning a C reorganization involving an S corporation).
23. Rev. Rul. 72-320, 1972-1 C.B. 270.
24. Rev. Rul. 72-496, 1973-2 C.B. 20.
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S provisions on a qualified stock acquisition under the Draft Bill. 25
Assume that Shareholder A owns 100% of the stock of T, which is
an electing S Corporation. Further assume that Shareholder A exchanges 100% of the T stock for 10% of the stock in Purchasing
Corporation T. It is immediately evident that there are two destructive elements. By transferring the S Corporation's stock to P, a
transfer has been made to a prohibited Shareholder. Since a corporation is ineligible to serve as a shareholder under Subchapter S the
election is terminated. Second, by transferring 100% of the stock of
S Corporation to P, a situation has been created where T has become a member of an affiliated group of corporations under section
1504. T could no longer qualify as a small business corporation
under section 1361(b)(1). The effect of disqualification is that the S
election will terminate under section 1362(d) as of the day before
the disqualifying event. As a consequence, the corporation will be a
Subchapter C corporation on the date of the stock transfer, and the
normal rules of Subchapter C would apply to the qualified stock
acquisition.
An interesting question may be postulated as to whether the results would be different if P immediately liquidated T. The answer
appears that it would not. While the Revenue Ruling 73-496 would
apply the step transaction doctrine in the event of an immediate termination, the result would still be the same. The affiliated corporations issue would be eliminated, but P would still be a disqualified
corporate shareholder. Thus, the S election could not be preserved
through the process of liquidation.
Consider next the impact of Subchapter S on a qualified asset acquisition. Assume that T, as an electing small business corporation,
transfers 100% of its assets to P in exchange for P's stock. This
transaction would qualify under present law as a C reorganization.
Since only assets are transferred to P, and not Subchapter S stock, T
avoids the problem of becoming an affiliated corporation and P does
not become an ineligible corporate shareholder. T would remain an
electing S Corporation and the transaction would be a qualified asset
acquisition under proposed section 391.
Would the transaction be affected by the application of the presumption in a qualified asset acquisition that the transaction is a cost
basis acquisition? Absent an affirmative election to have a carry-over
basis, P will have a cost basis in the acquired assets. Under proposed
25.

SFC Draft Bill was reported as Document 84-186 in Tax Notes, Jan. 9, 1984.

section 395, the acquired corporation T would be treated as having
sold all of its assets at fair market value on the acquisition date in a
transaction in which gain is recognized. Thus, T would recognize
gain equal to the excess fair market value of all of its assets over
basis. Under the proposed change, the gain would be treated as capital gain since it is treated as arising from a sale. Applying the rules
of Subchapter S under sections 1366 through 1368, all of the capital
gain which is recognized at the corporate level would pass through to
the S Corporation shareholders. The capital gains tax on the corporate gain would be taxed to the individual shareholders at the maximum 20% individual rate instead of at the 28% corporate level capital gain rate. The shareholders' basis in their stock would be
increased by the amount of gain recognized. Subsequently, the distribution of proceeds would be distributed on a tax-free basis under
section 1368.
Assume instead that T and P jointly elect to have a carryover basis asset acquisition. There would be no corporate level tax to T on
the disposition of depreciated assets. However, it becomes necessary
to anticipate that T would be liquidated because one of the proposed
requirements of the new Tax Reform Act would be that in a C reorganization, the target is required to liquidate. Section 1363(d) of
Subchapter S provides that upon the distribution of appreciated
property to shareholders, the distribution will be treated as if there
had been a sale of the assets to the transferees. Unfortunately, section 1363(d), as revised in 1982, did not distinguish between distributions in the nature of dividends, and distributions in liquidation or
in a reorganization.
The legislative history on section 1363 is somewhat interesting.
When Dudley Lang and I participated as members of the American
Bar Association task force in meeting with representatives of the
Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation prior to the preparation of
their preliminary Staff recommendations, the issue was first raised.
In the process of testing the consequences of converting from a dividend system to a partnership-like distribution system, concern arose
regarding a method for handling distributions of unrealized receivables and appreciated inventory, which are covered for partnerships
under section 751. It was resolved that the complex formulae of section 751 should be avoided under Subchapter S. The initial concept
envisioned only limited recognition of income at the corporate level
on the distribution of inventory and unrealized receivables. Subsequently, capital assets and section 1231 assets were discussed without any conclusion. When the final Staff recommendations came out,
it became evident that everything was thrown into the pot and all
distributions became taxable under Subchapter S. In addition to taxing the distribution as if it were a sale, the Subchapter S Revision
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Act went one step further and treated the distribution as if it were a
sale to the transferees. This raises the spector of section 1239 and
the consequential ordinary income impact on dispositions of depreciable property. Thus, it was in dealing with the section 751 collapsible partnership problems that the government finally overcame General Utilities2 6 in the area of Subchapter S.
In the context of the reform proposals, the key problem is whether
gain would be recognized under section 1363(d) for the distribution
of appreciated property in a post-reorganization liquidation. The
Senate Finance Committee Report explained that the corporate level
reorganization rule was not intended to apply to liquidations.2 7 However, the Internal Revenue Service has separately stated that such
distributions would be taxed at the corporate level because there is
no statutory exclusion for distributions in liquidation. It is anticipated that this problem will be resolved in proposed general income
tax reform legislation, which will provide that distributions in liquidations, in reorganizations and in 355 spin-offs will not be subjected
to tax at the corporate level. As a consequence, it appears, under the
reform proposals, that the assets received by T in the qualified acquisition of P could be distributed to the S corporation shareholders
without a tax at the corporate level.
In order to prevent an abuse in a situation where a Subchapter C
corporation might elect Subchapter S before a qualified acquisition,
in order to obtain the benefit of the single tax consequence, one of
the corporate reform proposals would apply a three-year pre-acquisition restriction similar to that which we have to prevent capital gain
bail outs under section 1374.
Brief consideration should be given to the impact of Subchapter S,
when the purchasing corporation is the S corporation. Because of the
prohibition against affiliation, P cannot acquire 80% or more of the
stock of T and continue to be qualified as an S corporation. Additional interesting issues are also raised under section 1371(a)(2). It
provides that when an S corporation is a shareholder of another corporation, it is to be treated as if it were an individual, not a corporation. Can P corporation, as an "individual", qualify as a corporate
26. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). See also
notes 17 and 21 and accompanying text.
27. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, subsequently amended section 1363(e) to provide that corporate recognition of gain shall not extend to distributions in liquidation as
in distribution reorganizations or spin-offs when sections 354, 355, or 356 permit the
receipt of property without the recognition of gain. See the Tax Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 721, 98 Stat. 494, 966 (1984).

party to an acquisition? I believe the answer clearly has to be "no."
Likewise, P, as an S corporation shareholder, would not be eligible to
participate in an election under section 338 because that privilege
applies only to a "purchasing corporation."
In conclusion, it appears that Subchapter S will offer some very
practical alternatives which will require a thorough examination. Although I have raised some problem areas for small business with the
new corporate tax reform proposals, it is evident that the reform proposals, taken as a whole, will be very beneficial to small businesses.

IMPACT OF THE PROPOSALS ON
DISTRIBUTIONS AND LIQUIDATIONS

DUDLEY M. LANG*

INTRODUCTION

For the purposes of this presentation, the term "closelyheld corporation" will usually correspond to the term "small business corporation" within the meaning of I.R.C. section 1361(b). Of course, one
should be aware that the two concepts do not always equate.
Small business owners generally prefer the corporate form of conducting business for a variety of non-tax reasons, (e.g., limited liability) as well as for tax reasons. In evaluating tax considerations, however, such owners are inclined to compare the results with those
achieved by a proprietorship or partnership form.
Characteristicsand Passages
As compared with a publicly held corporation, the objectives of a
closely held corporation tend to be aligned more closely with those of
its shareholders, thus creating a greater identity of interest. There
tends to be a greater incidence of transactions between them, with
fewer arms-length characteristics. The lifespan of a closely held corporation may be viewed as something less than eternal. Regarding
Jack Nolan's reference to the corporation that proceeds over several
generations; that may be an eastern viewpoint. In California, that
tradition has not been fully developed. The life of the closely held
corporation typically involves the several phases I will describe.
*
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Start-up Period
At its inception, a small business corporation often produces operating losses. Its owners are frequently unsure of the exact amount of
required capital, and may stand ready to invest additional funds as
the need arises. The shareholder-employees frequently forgo fair
market salary as a means to supplement working capital. During this
period, the corporation may elect under Subchapter S to pass
through operating losses to its shareholders.
Growth Period
When and if the fledgling business is fortunate enough to produce
net income, its earnings are frequently used to build working capital
and otherwise finance growth. The duration of this period is greatly
determined by the business philosophy of the owners and the longrange prospects of the business. During its course, the relatively low
federal corporate tax rates are usually attractive, and the corporation
will likely operate in the two-tier regime of Subchapter C.
Realization Period
When and if the corporate business achieves maturity, and it produces net income beyond its needs, greater attention is given to the
personal desires of its owners. Because of the harsh two-tier corporate tax structure, the shareholder-employees seek non-dividend realization. This procedure places stress in the Subchapter C regime on
issues such as reasonable compensation and accumulated earnings,
and may drive the parties to make a Subchapter S election.
Transition To Retirement
As the founding shareholders contemplate their own mortality, the
future course of the corporate business may be subject to only a relatively few alternatives:
(a) If key employees (including next generation family members)
are ready, willing, and able, they may be brought into the managerowner group, and the corporate existence may be continued;
(b) Independent management may be introduced in conjunction
with a public offering;
(c) The business may be sold;
(d) The business may be liquidated.
The Final Pay Off
In this writer's experience, relatively few small business corporations survive the first generation; the final pay off to the first generation owners (or their estates) is only occasionally large.
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Impact of Subchapter C

Measured by the sheer number of closely held corporations in the
corporate universe and the number of transactions with their shareholders, it surely is upon them that Subchapter C has its greatest
impact. The same may also be true in terms of total tax dollars, but
not as dramatically so.
NON-LIQUIDATING DISTRIBUTIONS

Summary of Proposed Changes

The bulk of proposed changes affecting non-liquidating distributions are contained in H.R. 4170 (sections 51-61) and S. 2062 (sections 31-51) pending before Congress.
Repeal of General Utilities
While the SFC draft of amendments to section 311 is a more thorough-going repeal with fewer exceptions, the amendments to section
311(d) contained in both H.R. 4170 (section 54) and S. 2062 (section 36) effectively would make corporate level gain recognition the
normal rule in nonliquidating distributions of appreciated property.'
Earnings And Profits Limitations
While not repealing the earnings and profits limitation for purposes of dividend treatment, S. 2062, section 47 would modify the
calculation of earnings and profits in many important respects:
(a) No deduction would be allowed for construction period interest
and taxes;
(b) Intangible drilling costs would be allowed ratably over the 60month period commencing with the date on which the assets are
placed in service;
(c) Mineral exploration and development costs would be allowed
ratably over the 120-day period commencing with the date on which
the assets are placed in service;
(d) No deduction would be allowed for certain trademark and
trade name expenditures;
(e) Gain realized upon distribution of appreciated property would
be included whether or not such gain is recognized;
1. Section 54 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 contains these proposals. See I.R.C.

§ 311(d) as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 54, 98 Stat.
494, 568 (1984).

(f) Any increase or decrease in the LIFO recapture amount would
be reflected;
(g) Installment sales gain would be included in the year of sale;
(h) Income reported on the completed contract method would be
reflected as if the taxpayer used the percentage of completion
method;
(i) ACRS deductions for fifteen-year and twenty-year real property would be limited to straight line amortization over a forty-year
period; and
() The charge to earnings and profits upon a stock redemption
would not exceed the ratable share allocable to the redeemed stock.
In addition, H.R. 4170, section 60 would amend section 312(a)(2) to
provide that the earnings and profits account would be reduced by
the original issue price of the corporation's own obligations, rather
than the face amounts.2
Acknowledging Professor Blum's point of view that the earnings
and profits limitation creates more difficulties than it solves and that
it should be repealed, my own judgment is that these changes, and
the tinkering inherent in them, will not have a serious impact upon
most closely held corporations.
Dividends Received Deduction
H.R. 4170 and S. 2062 each contain provisions which respond to
perceived abuses relating to the intercorporate dividends deduction
identified in the SFC Staff's Preliminary Report:
(a) The deduction would be reduced in the case of dividends paid
on debt financed stock (H.R. 4170, section 51; S. 2062, section 31);
(b) The basis of stock which is transferred before it has been held
for less than one year would be reduced by the nontaxed portion of
any extraordinary dividend, i.e., exceeding 5%of basis in the case of
preferred stock and 10% of basis in the case of common (H.R. 4170,
section 53, S. 2062, section 35); and
(c) Amounts paid on stock sold short in lieu of dividends would
increase the basis of the short shares, rather than be treated as deductible, overruling Revenue Ruling 62-64,' (H.R. 4170, section 56;
S. 2062, section 42).
Impact of Corporate Level Gain
Constraints already exist to limit nonliquidating distributions in
kind. First, because of the two-tier structure itself, few closely held
corporations follow a practice of distributing dividends. Moreover, in
2. See the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 61(c), 98 Stat. 494,
581 (1984).
3. Rev. Rul. 62-64, 1962-1 C.B. 33.
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the evolving world of section 31 (d) the opportunity to redeem stock
by distributing appreciated property has become limited. Corporate
level income may also be triggered by section 31 (b) and (c) (12) by
the numerous recapture provisions, and by various applications of
the tax benefit doctrine. The charge to earnings and profits is already
limited by the basis of the distributed property in the corporation's
hands. Finally, S corporations are already subject to a gain recognitions rule under section 1363(d).
A rule by which gain is recognized on all nonliquidating distributions of appreciated property is simple and certain, and will likely
cause taxpayers to use the arithmetic in all cases considering these
factors:
1. Above all, the economic reason for making a distribution in the
first place;
2. The amount of gain which would be recognized taking into account the adjusted basis of the property;
3. The character of gain, whether ordinary income, capital gain,
or some of each (e.g., due to recapture);
4. The effective tax cost of recognizing gain at the corporate level,
taking into account other taxable income, current operating loss or
net operating loss carryover;
5. The adjustment to earnings and profits occasioned by such gain
and the consequent increase in dividend potential;
6. The character of the distribution to the shareholder, applying
the rules of sections 301 and 302;
7. The effective tax cost to the shareholder of the distribution, taking into account other income, loss or loss carryover; and,
8. The future tax benefits to the shareholder of receiving property
with a fair market value basis, taking into account cost recovery and
antichurning rules.
Only if the arithmetic produces a favorable economic result should
distributions of appreciated property be made.
Effect Upon Specific Transactions
Transfer To Family Members
Shareholder A owns 60% of the stock of W Corporation and the
remaining 40% is owned by other family members. A proposes to
retire from the employ of W Corporation and to redeem all of his
stock pursuant to section 302(b)(3) and (c)(2). As a result, the family members would own all of the remaining shares of stock. In order
to effect payment to such shares, W Corporation must either dis-

tribute appreciated property to A, issue an installment note, or borrow on the security of the property. Taking into account the tax cost
of corporate level gain, the parties may conclude that a redemption
is feasible only with cash, including deferred cash. Alternatively, the
other family members may wish to consider a cross-purchase of
shares using an installment note or private annuity contract.
Transfer to Key Employees
Shareholder B owns 60% of the stock of X Corporation and the
remaining 40% is owned by key employees. B proposes to retire and
to redeem sufficient shares of stock to qualify under section
302(b)(2), thereby transferring control to the key employees. To accomplish such redemption, X Corporation must either distribute appreciated property, issue an installment note, or borrow on the security of it. Here too, the parties may opt for a cash transaction of some
sort.
Bootstrap Sale
Shareholder C, owning 100% of Y Corporation, has been approached by an independent party with a purchase proposal similar
to that involved in Zenz v. Quinliven.4 The redemption portion of the
transaction could be effected only by a distribution of appreciated
property, issuance of an installment note or by borrowing. In a cost
basis purchase, Y Corporation would recognize gain on the appreciated property. Otherwise, the parties may opt for a cash transaction.
Partial Liquidation
Shareholder D, an individual, owns 100% of Z Corporation which
operates two divisions of equal size, each constituting a qualified
trade or business for purposes of section 302(e)(3). D proposes that
Z Corporation distribute the assets of one of the divisions to himself
pursuant to section 302(b)(4) at which time he will look for a buyer.
Subject to the Court Holding Company5 doctrine, the amendment to
section 311(d) contained in H.R. 4170 and S. 2062 continue the exceptions for a partial liquidation.' The Senate Finance Committee
Staff proposals would end that exception.
4.
5.

43 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
Court Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 531 (1943), rev'd, 143 F.2d 823

(1944); aff'd, 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
6. See I.R.C. § 311(d) (1982) as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-369, § 354, 98 Stat. 494, 568 (1984).
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Spin-off
Assume in the last example, that Z Corporation transfers the assets of one of the divisions to the subsidiary corporation and distributes the subsidiary stock to D. If D retains the distributed stock and
the transaction qualifies as a divisive reorganization under section
355, it appears that Z Corporation would not recognize gain on any
appreciated value of the assets represented by the stock of the subsidiary. Both the current bills and the Senate Finance Committee
Staff proposals would except spin-off transactions from corporate
level gain recognition.
LIQUIDATING DISTRIBUTIONS

Proposed Repeal Of General Utilities
The rationale for the repeal of General Utilities' in the context of
liquidating distributions, the objections expressed to such repeal, and
the various relief proposals have been developed and discussed in
earlier presentations at this Conference. The proposal is the most
controversial aspect of the Senate Finance Committee Staff Proposals and will have by far its greatest impact upon closely held
corporations.
Summary of Provisions Affected
The proposal entails repeal of the following Internal Revenue
Code sections:
Section 336
The existing rule by which, (with exceptions) no gain or loss is
recognized to a corporation on distribution of property in complete
liquidation would be repealed.
Section 337
The favorite rule by which no gain or loss is recognized by a corporation upon the sale of a property provided it distributes all of its
assets within twelve months pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation would be repealed.
7.

General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).

Section 333
The rule by which a corporation with tolerably low earnings and
profits may liquidate with gain deferral and carryover basis to shareholders would be repealed. Even if it were not repealed, it would be
rendered virtually useless by the repeal of section 336, because gain
would increase earnings and profits.
Section 341
The dreaded but oft-sparing collapsible corporation rules would be
repealed on grounds that they would no longer be required.
Other Changes
Although the repeal of section 336 would curtail the tax advantage of a liquidation reincorporation, a statutory rule would deny a
step-up of basis in transactions involving corporations with 50% or
more overlapping share ownership.
Effect Upon Closely Held Corporations
Asset Sale And Liquidation
Without the benefit of sections 336 and 337, the typical sale of
assets and liquidation would produce gain at both the corporate level
and the shareholder level. While this result would parallel that
reached in the case of a taxable sale of stock coupled with a cost
basis election, it differs from that reached in the case of an asset sale
by a proprietorship, partnership or S corporation. Well advised taxpayers are likely to position themselves so that a properly aged Subchapter S election is established for purposes of the asset sale. Section 1374 does not preclude such approach; i.e., it is possible to
schedule gain in year 4, then liquidate.
Straight Liquidation
Fewer occasions would likely arise in which taxpayers would be
willing to incur the tax cost for the privilege of individual ownership
of corporate assets. However, with careful attention to arithmetic,
these factors may mitigate the cost:
(a) The corporation may have, in the aggregate, high basis for its
assets;
(b) The corporation may have low income, operating losses, or operating loss carryover;
(c) The shareholders may have high basis stock;
(d) The shareholders may have low income, operating losses or
operating loss carryover.
Moreover, a Subchapter S election may be made more than three
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years prior to liquidation as a means to avoid corporate level taxation of gain.
Liquidation Upon Shareholder Death
Under existing law, the death of a 100% shareholder presents an
opportunity to liquidate the corporation with little or no gain recognized at either level. With the repeal of General Utilities, corporate
level gain would be recognized. However, a properly aged Subchapter S election could obviate even that.
Planning Toward S Corporation Status
In my opinion, the SFC proposals correctly exempt S corporations
from general gain recognition on liquidation. The Preliminary Report suggests, similar to that of section 1374, that the Subehapter S
election be in effect for at least three years prior to liquidation. The
good news is that the three-year aging process would likely present
little difficulty to most closely held corporations. Where possible, a
closely held corporation should position itself to become eligible as
an S corporation at such time as it becomes advantageous. The bad
news is that not every closely held corporation can achieve eligibility
and not every taxpayer is well advised.
CONCLUSION

The changes proposed by the Senate Finance Committee Staff, including repeal of General Utilities,will not likely cause taxpayers to
avoid the corporate form of business. However, corporations will be
even less likely to distribute appreciated property as dividends or in
redemption of stock. In the context of complete liquidations Subchapter S would be raised to greater importance. Recognizing this, it
may become useful to review the eligibility provisions of Subchapter
S in order to allow a greater number of closely held corporations to
become S corporations.

